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JURISDICTION 
Myres S. McDougal 
In public and private international 
law, the word "jurisdiction "-in ety-
mological origin, speaking the law-is 
used to refer to the competence of a 
state-the authority of a state as recog-
nized by international decision-makers 
and by other states-to make law for, 
and to apply law to,particular events or 
particular controversies. I emphasize the 
word particular in order to distinguish, 
as :.will be seen below, the claims to 
authority with which we are here con-
cerned from other and more compre-
hensive claims of state officials to con-
tinuous control over bases of power, 
such as territory and people. 
It is in this sense-in the sense of 
competence or authority to prescribe 
and apply law to particular events-that 
the subject of Jurisdiction is important 
to Naval Officers and it is in this sense 
that, with your permission, I propose to 
explore the subject. It needs no empha-
sis to this audience that the Naval 
Officer is both the agent of the au-
thority of one state and a possible 
object of the application of authority of 
other states. The authority of any par-
ticular officer may not be coextensive 
with that of his state, depending upon 
the hierarchy of command and degrees 
of delegation, but for determining the 
lawfulness of a controverted exercise of 
authority by or upon an officer in 
events involving other states, it is com-
monly necessary to consider the 
comprehensive authority of a state as 
against other states. 
It has probably already been sensed 
that this common use of the term 
"jurisdiction, " which I suggest we 
adopt, is not simple. The term does in 
fact refer to certain reciprocal processes 
of claim and of decision, of assertions of 
authority by one state against other 
states and of responding acceptance or 
rejection by international decision-
makers or other states, which may 
become quite complex. 
In parenthesis, and by way of 
apology, may I say that in order to be 
both comprehensive and brief I must of 
necessity make my remarks somewhat 
abstract. The facts of the controversies 
with which we deal are, however, often 
most dramatic. A citizen of the United 
States shoots a citizen of Brazil on 
board a Swiss plane in flight from 
Shannon to Gander. A citizen of the 
United States seeks to levy upon a 
warship of Napoleon anchored in an 
American harbor, claiming the ship as 
his private property formerly seized by 
violence. Canadian officials invade New 
York State and set an American barge 
adrift over Niagara Falls. The United 
States shoots an artificial satellite into 
outer space, which traverses the air 
space of the Soviet Union as it departs 
or returns. A beautiful lady from the 
Soviet Union leaps from an upper floor 
of the Soviet Consulate in New York 
City into the waiting arms of a New 
York policeman. A soldier of the United 
States commits all the crimes in the 
book while on holiday in France. A ship 
flying the French flag rams a Turkish 
llhip in the Sea of Marmora, killing 
citizens of various nationalities. The 
wife of the Chinese delegate to the 
United Nations sues him for divorce and 
alimony in New York City. The United 
States tests a nuclear weapon in the 
Pacific, and creates a molten inferno 
where once there was an inhabited 
tropical paradise-and so on. May I ask 
you to recall, as I talk, cases such as 
these and perhaps other cases from your 
experience as an officer, or from our 
directive, in order to give flesh and 
blood to the very bare remarks I must 
make? 
For the purpose of attempting to 
subdue the complexity of our subject, I 
propose that we organize our inquiry 
into three main, though not equally 
extensive, parts: 
First, and briefly, an examination of 
the factual process in which states 
assert, as against each other, claims to 
exercise authority with respect to par-
ticular even ts. 
Next, and in somewhat more detail, 
an exploration of the processes of 
decision by which the lawfulness of 
claims, with some being accepted and 
some rejected, is determined. 
Finally, and as fully as our time will 
permit, an examination of the more 
important trends in decision and estab-
lished policies with respect to claims 
relating to the various spatial dO!llains: 
land, waters, air space, and outer space. 
This latter inquiry may enable us to 
identify some of the explanatory factors 
which have conditioned different 
decisions and policies with respect to 
the different spatial domains and, 
hence, cautiously to project certain 
possible developments into the future. 
We begin with brief reference to the 
factual process in which claims to juris-
diction are asserted. This process in-
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cludes certilin claimants making, as 
against each other, certain claims to the 
exercise of authority, with ,respect to 
events occurring within different spatial 
domains, by differing methods, for 
various general and specific objectives, 
and under greatly varying conditions. 
The claimants, who assert as against 
each other claims to jurisdiction, are the 
officials of nation-states, of territorially 
organized communities. As such of-
ficials, they have at their disposal cer-
tain bases of power, including certain 
continuous, but varying, control over 
resources, over people, and over com-
munity value processes. 
The claims to exercise authority we 
have already described as claims to 
competence to make and apply law. In 
conventional terms such competence is 
sometimes described as legislative, 
executive, judicial, and administrative. 
Such conventional terms refer, however, 
more precisely to institutions rather 
than to competences or functions. A 
more comprehensive and scientific 
d.escription might make reference to 
intelligence, recommending, prescribing, 
invoking, applying, appraising and 
terminating functions. For our immedi-
ate purposes, purposes relevant to the 
more important concerns of the Naval 
Officer, a focus upon !he prescribing 
and applying functions, the making and 
execution of law, will perhaps suffice. It 
is, however, important to keep clearly in 
mind the distinction alluded to above 
between the comprehensive claims by 
state officials to those continuous con-
trols over resources, people, and value 
processes which constitute their general 
and enduring bases of power and the 
more particular claims to exercise 
authority with respect to occasional, 
episodic events which are ordinarily 
described as claims of jurisdiction. The 
former claims insist that "this is my 
territory" or "this is my national" or 
"these are my value processes" for all 
purposes; the latter claims insist only 
that, because of certain factors of 
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spatial location or of nationality or of 
impact upon national interest and so on, 
the claimant can make law for or apply 
law to a particular event in controversy. 
These very different factual claims are 
governed by very different technical 
rules which seek quite different policies. 
The particular events with respect to 
which jurisdiction is claimed may, of 
course, occur in anyone of the spatial 
domains: upon the territory of the 
claimant state or of another state, upon 
the high seas, within the air space over 
the claimant state or another state or 
the high seas, or in outer space. The 
complexity in institutional detail and 
range of spatial impact of such particu-
lar events may, as was seen in the cases 
alluded to above, vary greatly. The 
actors in such events may be official or 
non-official, individual or group, corpo-
rate or non-corporate, national or non-
national, civilian or military. The values 
at stake in the interaction may embrace 
security, power, wealth, enlightenment, 
respect, rectitude, or others. The 
changes being contested may have taken 
place by agreement or by deprivation, by 
consent or by coercion. The territorial 
range of the impacts of the significant 
events may extend to one or several 
states and mayor may not include the 
state of the claimant. Resources af-
fected may vary from land to ships and 
aircraft or spacecraft or other movables, 
and may be variously located. States 
other than that of the claimant mayor 
may not have engaged in "acts of state" 
with respect to the same contested value 
changes and, where such acts of state 
are asserted, they may be legislative, 
executive, or judicial. The state whose 
prior acts of state are invoked mayor 
may not have been recognized by the 
claimant or other states, and so on. 
The methods by which claims are 
asserted are commonly diplomatic in 
form, ranging from unilateral assertions 
by a single state through the multiple 
variations of group or multilateral claim. 
Yet omnipresent behind the diplomatic 
forms, and employed in varying com-
binations and with differing degrees of 
intensity and overtness, are the other 
familiar instruments of policy: ideologi-
cal, economic, and military. 
The objectives for which officials 
assert claims to jurisdiction embrace all 
the objectives characteristic of the 
nation-state: in the most abstract form, 
the protection and enhancement of the 
bases of power of self and of allies, the 
weakening and disintegration of the 
bases of power of enemies and potential 
enemies, and the effectiv~ employment 
of all available bases of power for 
maximization of all the values of the 
territorial body politic. 
The conditions under which claims 
are asserted include, again in most 
abstract statement, all the variables of a 
global power process, of a world arena 
in which the territorially organized com-
munities which we call states, and other 
participants such as transnational politi-
cal parties, pressure groups, and business 
associations, continuously engage each 
other with all instruments of policy. 
Among the variables, or factors, of 
greatest significance for our immediate 
purposes, purposes of accounting for 
past or projecting future decisions about 
jurisdiction may be mentioned: the 
number, spatial location, and relative 
strength of the participants in the arena; 
the state of technological development 
for purposes of communication, trans-
port, production, and destruction; and 
the degrees of intensity of the partici-
pants' expectations of violence. 
With this brief orientation in the 
factual process of claim, let us now turn 
to the other and reciprocal process, the 
process of decision by which the lawful-
ness of asserted claims is determined. 
This second process includes, in compre-
hensive formulation, certain established 
decision-makers, seeking certain shared 
objectives, by the elaboration and appli-
cation of certain authoritative princi-
ples, under certain conditions. 
The decision-makers established by 
the authoritative perspectives of the 
participants in the world arena include, 
of course, the officials of international 
tribunals and organizations and of 
specially constituted arbitral tribunals. 
But by far the most important decision-
makers, important both in the quantita-
tive terms of the number of decisions 
made and in the qualitative terms of the 
significance of the issues determined, 
are those same nation-state officials who 
in another capacity are mere claimants. 
The decisions of these officials are taken 
in countless interactions in foreign 
offices, special conferences, national 
courts, national legislatures, and so on. 
It may perhaps bear emphasis, because 
so much misconception prevails upon 
the point, that this does not mean that 
there are no objective decision-makers 
for questions of jurisdiction, or of inter-
national law generally. Though any par-
ticular official of a state may on occa-
sion be a claimant for his state, on 
multiple other occasions he is among 
the officials of the seventy-nine odd 
states who in a given instance are 
passing upon the lawfulness of the 
claims of the officials of the eightieth 
state. In this latter capacity the state 
official may be just as objective, and 
just as much moved by perspectives 
shared in the whole community of 
statcs, as a municipal decision-maker 
upon internal problems is objective and 
is moved by perspectives shared in the 
territorial community which he repre-
sents. The duality in function of nation-
state officials does not represent a lack 
of internationalization and objectivity 
in function, but rather a lack of speciali-
zation and of centralization. 
The shared objectives of the estab-
lished decion-makers of the world arena 
include, of course, the characteristic 
objectives of nation-states mentioned 
above, both of protecting bases of 
power and of promoting employment of 
such bases in the maximum production 
of all values. Beyond these, however, are 
certain other objectives which are a 
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function of the fact that a number of 
such territorially organized communities 
must interact in a common world arena. 
Among the objectives of this second 
type perhaps the most important is that 
of creating a certain stability in the 
expectations of all decision-makers that 
the aggregate flow of cases will be 
handled in certain agreed ways, with a 
minimum assertion of raw, effective 
power-a stability of expectation of 
uniformity in decision which will, in 
other words, permit rational power and 
other value calculations with a mini-
mum disruption from unrestrained 
coercion and violence. Still another such 
objective is that of promoting efficiency 
not only in the disposition of contro-
versies but also in all value interactions 
across boundaries and in the exploita-
tion of world resources best enjoyed in 
common. It may be recalled that in the 
Hydrogen Bomb article the major policy 
purpose which we found to inspire the 
whole regime of the law of the sea was 
"not merely the negation of restrictions 
upon navigation and fishing but also the· 
promotion of the most advantageous-
that is, the most conserving and fully 
utilizing-peaceful use and development 
by all peoples of a great common 
resource covering two-thirds of the 
world's surface, for all contemporary 
values. " 
The principles which established 
decision-makers elaborate and apply, for 
achievement of all these shared objec-
tives, are of manifold reference and 
varying degrees of generality. For brief 
indication, they may be described as of 
three different types. The first type is 
composed of those principles sometimes 
called the "bases" of jurisdiction-the 
principle of territoriality, the principle 
of nationality, the protective theory, 
the principle of passive personality, and 
the principle of universality in the name 
of which a state, which has acquired 
some effective control over persons or 
resources, asserts its authority and is in 
fact authorized by external decision-
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makers to exercise such authority to 
make and apply its law to certain 
particular events in which such persons 
or resources have been involved. 'fhe 
second type of principle is composed of 
those principles by which a state, 
though it has acquired such effective 
control over persons or resources, 
decides, or is required to decide, that it 
will yield its effective power in de-
ference to the "acts of state" or the 
"immunities" of another state and 
permit that state to make and apply its 
law to the events in question. The third 
type of principle is constituted by those 
principles which individualize both sets 
of complementary principles indicated 
above, both those embodying the pri-
mary assertions of authority and those 
embodying deferences to others, to take 
into account the special characteristics 
of the various spatial domains: territory, 
the high seas, air space, and outer space. 
The point which commonly requires 
most emphasis to non-lawyers is that 
these various principles are not designed 
as precise and rigid commands, arbi-
trarily dictating preordained conclu-
sions, but rather as flexible and mal-
leable guides to rational and reasonable 
decision. A little work with the actual 
decisions quickly makes it clear, first, 
that the major principles, asserting 
authority and yielding deference, are 
complementary in form, permitting 
decision in any direction; and, secondly, 
that within anyone set of principles the 
major concepts are so vaguely defined as 
to permit the ascription of an infinite 
variety of concrete meaning, and hence, 
the justification of a considerable num-
ber of alternatives in decision. The 
function of the various principles is, 
accordingly, not dogmatically to dictate 
decision but rather to focus the atten-
tion of the decision-maker upon all the 
significant features of a context in 
controversy, and, hence, to assist the 
decision-maker in assessing the relevance 
of such features in relation to each 
other. Thus, the territoriality principle 
points to the locus of events in contro-
versy, and the range of their territorial 
impact, and emphasizes the importance 
of the resource base in the community 
process in which people apply institu-
tions to resources for the production of 
values. The "territorial" principle is, in 
other words, but an elliptical expression 
of a "community" principle. Similarly, 
the nationality principle points to the 
primary community allegiance of the 
actors in an event and emphasizes the 
importance of manpower and member-
ship in community value processes. The 
protective principle, similarly, in au-
thorizing a state to take measures 
against direct attack upon its security 
and other values, though the events 
occur abroad, constitutes an explicit 
recognition of the major policy frame-
work which we have suggested for the 
whole subject of jurisdiction. The 
passive personality theory that the state 
of the nationality of an injured party 
has jurisdiction wherever events occur, 
and equivalent theories permitting the 
diplomatic protection of citizens 
abroad, again emphasizes the im-
portance of community membership. 
The universality principle, similarly, 
emphasizes the common interest of all 
states in repressing unauthorized vio-
lence upon the high seas, war crimes, 
slave trading, and comparable depriva-
tions of human dignity. The doctrine of 
deference to the "acts of state" of 
another government, to turn to some of 
the complementary principles, is a clear 
expression of the recognized need for 
reciprocal tolerance and of the sanction-
ing fear of retaliation. The principles 
embodying immunity for state officials 
and organs, for ambassadors and war-
ships, are, finally, expressions of con-
cession to mutual dignity and efficiency 
in indispensable intercourse. _ The func-
tion of all such principles might perhaps 
be said, in sum, to be to authorize the 
decision-makers of the state most af-
fected by any particular events to 
decide the law for that event, upon 
condition that it take into account the 
degrees of involvement of the values of 
other states in such, and other com-
parable, events. 
The conditions in the context of 
which established decision-makers must 
operate are, in most general formula-
tion, of course, the same as for claim-
ants. Among the factors most significant 
for trend in decision may be mentioned, 
however, both the degree of inter-
dependence in fact between states for 
the achievement of demanded values 
and the degree to which decision-makers 
have knowledge of whatever inter-
dependence in fact exists. Such factors 
may vitally affect both trends in deci-
sion and the sanctions which are avail-
able for making decisions effective. 
With orientation now in both the 
factual process of claim and the authori-
tative process of decision, let·us tum, 
finally, to the promised examination of 
the more important trends in decision 
and established policies with respect to 
the various spatial domains. 
We begin with the land-base of a 
state, and will talk of "territory, " 
though territory is a legalistic concept 
which embraces, as is well known, not 
merely land but certain waters and air 
space as well. 
It is a commonplace, today, of both 
public and private international law that 
the territorial principle of jurisdiction 
remains the most basic organizing prin-
ciple in a world order constituted pri-
marily of, and by, territorially organized 
states. It is this principle which, first, 
authorizes the decision-makers of any 
particular territorial community in 
which resources are located and events 
occur, as representatives of the com-
munity most concerned with such re-
sources and most affected by such 
events, to prescribe and apply law with 
respect to such resources and events; 
and, second, permits the decision-
makers of all such territorial communi-
ties, considered as a larger global com-
munity, to order, by the process of 
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mutual deference and tolerance indi-
cated above in application of this prin-
ciple, the larger affairs transcending the 
boundaries of any single community 
with the highest degree of economy and 
fairness and the highest degree of sta-
bility in common expectation. 
One of the clearest expositions of 
this principle, with indication of its 
roots and function, is that of Professor 
AIf Ross of Denmark. I quote: 
It is a historical fact that the 
various states are separated from 
each other and bounded terri-
torially. This of course is not 
fortuitous but deeply rooted in 
the nature of the case. The states 
are prirriarily an organization of 
power. Each of them claims to be, 
within a certain territory sepa-
rated from others, the supreme 
power in relation to its subjects (a 
self-governing community). The 
simplest principle, almost a matter 
of course, for the individualiza-
tion and separation of these 
competing instruments of power 
is the spatial or territorial. 1 
Professor Ross adds: 
In conformity herewith the 
fundamental international legal 
norm of the distribution of com-
petence is to the effect that every 
state is competent, and exclu-
sively competent, within its own 
territory to perform acts which-
actually or potentially-consist in 
the working of the compulsory 
apparatus of the state (the maxim 
of territorial supremacy).2 
The most important aspect, the hall-
mark, of this principle is, as Professor 
Ross indicates, in its prescription of 
exclusivity for the territorial sovereign. 
The principle serves not merely as an 
expression of the comprehensive power 
of the territorial sovereign to exercise its 
authority over all resources, persons, 
and activities located, acting, or occur-
ring within its domain but also as a 
prohibition addressed to the officials of 
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all other states requiring them to keep 
hands off and out. It is, further, by this 
principle that the territorial sovereign is 
authorized to subordinate to its effec-
tive power all the various functional 
groups; parties, pressure groups, and 
private associations, domestic or for-
eign, which operate within its boun-
daries. This notion of the supremacy of 
the territorial sovereign over all non-
territorial representatives is, indeed, 
basic to the very conception of the 
territorially organized state and its 
emergence was undoubtedly condi-
tioned by the same factors which condi-
tioned the emergence of the nation-
state. In days when the strategy of 
attack was by horizontal encirclement 
and with primitive weapons, spatial con-
tiguity, walls, and moats, and fixed 
boundaries were perhaps found to be an 
indispensable asset in defense; and 
security and the greater production of 
demanded values were found to depend 
upon the monopolization of territorial 
authority and control and not in its 
common enjoyment with functional or 
other nonterritorial competitors. 
It is familiar learning that certain 
internal waters, a still debated extent of 
air space, and in certain measure a 
narrow belt of the oceans, called the 
"territorial sea," are universally compre-
hended within the concept of "terri-
tory" for purposes of jurisdiction. The 
degree of exclusivity in authority which 
is claimed with respect to internal 
waters and the territorial sea is, how-
ever, commonly somewhat less than 
with respect to land. The officials of 
states other than the territorial state are 
under certain conditions permitted to 
exercise authority with respect to events 
occurring upon ships which fly their flag 
even when such ships are in internal 
waters. Still greater generosity is com-
monly accorded when such ships are 
tr aversing the territorial sea; this 
generosity is, of course, summed up in 
the much discussed right of innocent 
passage. 
The broad scope of the jurisdiction 
which state officials claim under the 
territorial principle of jurisdiction may 
perhaps best be demonstrated by 
reference to one subordinate application 
of the principle which is known as the 
doctrine of "impact territoriality." The 
tenor of this doctrine is that even 
though certain events occur beyond the 
boundaries of the claimant state, per-
haps even within the domain of another 
state, if such events have important 
consequences to the value processes of 
the claimant state, the latter may law-
fully apply whatever effective control it 
may have over the actors in such events, 
or the resources of such actors, for the 
reasonable protection of its interests. 
Thus, the United States has, under this 
doctrine, justified the application of its 
antitrust statutes to agreements, made 
abroad between nonnationals, and con-
templating performance only abroad, 
when such agreements were clearly in-
tended to affect prices and production 
within the United States. Some other 
states, as well as a number of American 
lawyers, have contested this application 
by the United States of the doctrine of 
impact territoriality, contending that 
the doctrine is only applicable to such 
simple matters as the shooting of guns 
across boundaries, but the practice of 
the United States would'seem to be well 
within the compass of a broad policy 
authorizing decision by the territorial 
community most importantly affected 
by particular events. 
For purposes of dispelling a common 
misconception, it may be desirable to 
mention also a doctrine converse to that 
of impact territoriality. The import of 
this doctrine is that when a state exer-
cises its jurisdiction by application of its 
authority to persons or resources actu-
ally physically present within its terri-
torial domain-that is, controlling per-
sons or resources located within the 
spatial sphere of its exclusive sover-
eignty-the mere fact that the exercise 
of such jurisdiction may have factual 
consequences, factual effects, beyond 
the boundaries of the acting state, 
whether upon the high seas or in the 
domain of another state, is legally irrele: 
vant In our contemporary inter-
dependent world, in which everybody's 
activities affect those of everybody else, 
no other conclusion could be tolerable. 
If a state's laws were invalid merely 
because their application has effects 
upon the interests and activities of 
people beyond its boundaries, govern-
ment could not go on. The application 
by the United States of its antitrust 
laws, for example, to persons within its 
domain obviously affects business activi-
ties over all the world; and what is true 
of antitrust laws is no less true of 
commercial laws generally, immigration 
laws, maritime laws, monetary controls, 
and so on. 
It is, of course, from their territorial 
base that state officials project all the 
controls they assert over their nationals 
abroad and over nonnationals, through 
the protective, passive personality, and 
universality theories, for activities 
beyond the territorial domain of the 
claimant state. The details of all these 
important claims to authority, fully 
sanctioned in most part by international 
law, we must perforce leave to others or 
for another day. It may, however, be 
noted that the nationality principle ex-
tends not only to individuals but also to 
ships, aircraft and corporations, and 
perhaps even to spacecraft, and that 
under the nationality principle the 
United States has asserted authority to 
control its citizens in almost every 
aspect of life, from taxes through the 
gamut of crime and regulation of 
business activity to death for treason. 
It should be remembered, also, in 
final consideration of the territorial 
principle, that state officials, even when 
they have effective control over persons 
and resources, may on occasion be 
required by certain principles of "act of 
state" and "immunity," completely 
complementary to the various principles 
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which we 'have been considering, to 
forego the exercise of their own au-
thority and to yield control to others. 
The details of these principles ramify 
through various requirements with 
respect to what constitutes appropriate 
legislative, executive, and judicial acts of 
state which must be honored by other 
states, and through a lot of relatively 
uninteresting, though not entirely un-
important, niceties with respect to the 
various exemptions of heads of state, 
diplomats, public ships, and public 
corporations and agencies. 
From dull, dry land, let us now turn, 
after much too long, to the oceans of 
the world. Here, as you all know, we 
find a completely different develop-
ment Because of various historical 
conditions, including most notably 
perhaps the fact of a multipolar arena, 
exhibiting a number of relatively equal 
participants, and a state of technological 
and industrial development in which 
nobody was able to chase everybody 
else off, emphasis in the law of the sea 
for some centuries has not been upon 
exclusivity in use but upon use in 
common. The experience of 150 years 
at least has shown that the oceans of the 
world can be used concurrently by all, 
without any special injury to anyone, 
for the great common advantage. By 
that elaborate set of complementary 
doctrines, known as the customary law 
of the sea, it has been possible effec-
tively to internationalize the oceans of 
the world, without the establishment of 
much special international machinery. 
One set of these doctrines, generally 
referred to under the label of "freedom 
of the seas," was formulated, and is 
commonly invoked, to protect uni-
lateral claims to ,navigati<?n, fishing, fly-
ing over the oceans, cable-laying, and 
other similar uses. The other set of 
doctrines includes prescriptions summed 
up in a wide variety of technical terms 
such as "territorial sea," "contiguous 
zone," "jurisdiction," "continental 
shelf," "self-defense," and so on, 
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protecting such other interests as 
security, enforcement of health, neu-
trality and customs regulations, conser-
vation or monopolization of fisheries, 
exploitation of the sedentary fisheries 
and mineral resources of the seabed, and 
the conducting of naval manoeuvres, 
military exercises, and other peacetime 
defensive activities, and so on. 
The most important elements in the 
total structure are, of course: 
1. The confining of the territorial 
belt to relatively narrow limits; 
2. The honoring of contiguous zones 
for all important national purposes, in 
the absence of unreasonable inter-
ference with others; 
3. The common use of the broader 
expanses of the oceans for the great 
variety of purposes indicated above; 
4. The notions of the nationality of 
ships and of the national responsibility 
of states for their ships; and 
5. The law of piracy for the repres-
sion of unauthorized violence. 
The details of this structure are perhaps 
already too familiar to you and may be 
discussed by others. What I should like 
to emphasize is the high degree of 
flexibility and adaptability in the whole 
structure, with reference especially to 
the overriding principle of common 
interest and the omnipresent specific 
test, whatever its verbal formulation, of 
reasonableness. Some of the conven-
tional presentations of the law of the 
sea seem to me, quite unfortunately, to 
approach caricature of the actual 
process of decision. The most recent 
report, the 1956 report, of the United 
Nations International Law Commission, 
with all deference to the distinguished 
jurists who did the work, does not, I 
fear, entirely escape misconception. Its 
most grievous defect resides in a some· 
what mechanical overrigidification of 
many technical concepts, ineluding both 
the notions of the freedom of the seas 
and of contiguous zones. In Article 66, 
for example, only one contiguous zone 
is provided for, and it is confined to the 
protection of customs, fiscal and sani-
tary measures. No mention is made of 
security. Some of you will undoubtedly 
share with me, too, misgivings that the 
ambiguity in Article 3 of the provision 
with respect to the territorial sea rule 
continues to encourage expansionist 
claims. From an accurate description of 
past practice, it may, of course, be seen 
that there is not simply one contiguous 
zone, but multiple contiguous zones for 
all important national interests, and that 
security is one of the interests which has 
been most honored in prior practice. 
Freedom of the seas, similarly, has been 
in practice regarded as no more of an 
absolute than any of the other doctrines 
protecting unilateral assertions of au-
thority. The fact is that in appropriate 
contexts all important interests, reason-
ably asserted, have achieved protection. 
From all this, the answer to the 
question as to the legality of defensive 
zones, is not difficult. The answer 
depends upon whether in context the 
claim is reasonable. How high is the 
expectation of violence? How important 
and how large is the area claimed? What 
is the extent and the duration of inter-
ference with others? And so on. 
Let us turn now from the oceans of 
the world back to the air space above 
land. With respect to this spatial 
domain, it is familiar history how ex-
clusivity once again prevailed over com-
mon use. Despite a number of demands 
at the beginning of this century for a 
freedom of airspace comparable to the 
freedom of the seas, it soon became 
clear that vertical power could control 
horizontal and that sovereignty over 
land and territorial sea could not be 
protected without sovereignty over air 
space, and the conclusion was certain. 
The history of this development has 
been recounted many times, and before 
this college by the distinguished au-
thority, Professor John C. Cooper. I will 
not repeat it. The essential point is that 
universal national practice, as consoli-
dated, for examples, in the Paris 
Convention of 1919 and the Chicago 
Convention of 1944, has established 
that same exclusivity of jurisdiction of 
the territorial sovereign for overlying 
airspace as for underlying land. With the 
elaborate qualifications to this exclu-
sivity created by various conventions in 
the interest of international commerce, 
we need not now concern ourselves. The 
customary doctrine does not recognize 
even such right of innocent passage as 
qualifies the territorial sea. 
Finally, we reach that domain of 
most contemporary speculative interest, 
the outer spaces. To pose the problem it 
is convenient to quote a few remarks 
from a column by Roscoe Drummond 
entitled ''The Blue Wild Yonder": 
Soon this will be no theoretical 
matter. The United States, the 
Soviet Union and Britain have 
announced that they are building 
satellites to revolve 200 to 300 
miles above the earth's surface 
and are planning to dispatch a few 
high-altitude rockets beyond the 
earth's atmospheric coat. The 
scientists foresee manned space 
stations coasting in the earth's 
orbit for indefinite periods, useful 
for refueling space ships and for 
astronomical and physical re-
search. Next step: experimental 
flights to the moon; scheduled 
flights later. 
The lawyers are just beginning 
to get a slippery grip on the legal 
aspects of outer space, issues of 
overhead sovereignty and freedom 
of passage. 
Turning to this slippery grip of the 
lawyers, I would refer to the remarks of 
two very distinguished commentators 
on international law. The first are those 
of Mr. Wilfred Jenks, who is perhaps 
one of the two or three most eminent 
writers in the field of international law 
today, which appeared in the Interna-
tional and Comparative Law Quarterly 
of January 1956. Mr. Jenks concludes 
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that air space beyond the atmosphere of 
the earth is a res extra commercium 
incapable by its nature of appropriation 
on behalf of any particular sovereignty 
based on a fraction of the earth's 
surface. He argues in justification that 
"Space beyond the atmosphere of the 
earth presents a much closer analogy to 
the high seas than to the air space above 
the territory of a state" and that "the 
projection of the territorial sovereignty 
of a state beyond the atmosphere above 
its territory would be so wholly out of 
relation to the scale of the universe as to 
be ridiculous; it would be rather like the 
island of St. Helena claiming jurisdiction 
over the Atlantic." He notes that such a 
projection of sovereignty "would give us 
a series of adjacent irregular shaped 
cones with a constantly changing con-
tent" and that celestial bodies would 
move in and out of the zones all the 
time. He concludes that "in these cir-
cumstances the concept of a space cone 
of sovereignty is a meaningless and 
dangerous abstraction. " 
The most obvi0us defect in Mr. 
Jenks' analysis is that it does not go far 
enough. Because of certain technologi-
cal considerations outlined by Mr. 
Jenks, it is of course impossible for all 
nation-states to project exclusive claims 
to control indefinitely into outer space. 
There is little point to seeking territorial 
location for either threats from outer 
space or the assertions of effective 
power to cope with such threats. The 
important problems will relate to the 
reconciliation of multiple assertions of 
effective control in spaces accessible to 
all and, hence, common to all in the 
absence of territorial nexus individual-
ized to anyone state. 
Building upon Mr. Jenks, Professor 
Cooper, who previously had taken a 
position emphasizing the importance of 
potentialities of effective control in 
resolving these issues, now offers some 
very curious suggestions based upon a 
misconception of the law of the sea. 
Professor Cooper first argues in great 
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detail that previous agreements are ir-
relevant with respect to the question of 
outer space and he includes much detail 
on prior definitions of "air space" and 
"aircraft," all of which would appear 
unnecessary. The reasons these previous 
agreements are irrelevant is that neither 
the major purposes nor the detailed 
expectations of the parties who negoti-
ated and ratified them included the 
present problem of outer space. 
There is, of course, as yet no cus-
tomary law of outer space. The recom-
mendations which Professor Cooper 
derives from the public international 
law of the high seas would appear 
further to be quite unsound and im-
probable. He recommends that we 
establish a regime of outer space which 
he regards as comparable to the law of 
the sea. He suggests that nation·states 
affirm by agreement that the subjacent 
state has full sovereignty over the rela-
tively narrow belt of atmospheric space 
above -it. Next, the "sovereignty of the 
subjacent state" would extend upward 
to include a "contiguous space" of 300 
miles, with a right of transit through it 
for all nonmilitary craft when ascending 
or descending. Finally, he recommends 
acceptance of the principle "that all 
space above 'contiguous space' is free 
for the passage of all instrumentalities. " 
Among several observations which 
might be made upon Professor Cooper's 
thesis, the primary one is that it com-
pletely misconceives the law of the sea. 
An accurate portrayal of the law of the 
sea does not show us a nice set of 
boundaries-three miles of territorial 
sea, a single contiguous zone, and 
absolute freedom of use beyond. It 
shows a continual demand to increase 
the width of the territorial sea, a great 
variety of contiguous zones, not one but 
a dozen or more, and many examples of 
power being asserted unilaterally on the 
oceans of the world for all kinds of 
national purposes. The great variety of 
contiguous zones and unilateral 
assertions of competence are today 
honored in authoritative prescription. 
We might observe also that Professor 
Cooper's notions are built upon the 
existing state of technology with respect 
to the distances to which effective 
control from land surfaces is presently 
possible. But one cannot assume that 
this technology is static and that we will 
not later have even more effective con-
trol of objects at an even greater dis-
tance in space. 
To come to any practical recommen-
dations upon this problem would re-
quire a great deal of information con-
cerning factual conditions and probable 
future developments, much of which 
information is of course not now avail-
able. It is, however, my understanding 
that, at the moment, neither Russia nor 
the United States is technologically 
capable of shooting down objects 
launched into outer space and also that 
neither can even control such an object 
after it reaches outer space. One would 
also gather that it would be impossible 
for either state to launch a satellite 
without traversing the air space above 
the other, which traversing would of 
course be a technical infringement of 
the exclusive zone claimed by each. It is 
my understanding, further, that there is 
not even one chance in a million of any 
damage being done to the surface by the 
falling of one of the presently con-
templated satellites. 
The apparent immediate uses of the 
proposed satellites will be to photo· 
graph various parts of the earth's sur-
face, to fix the location of cities much 
more precisely than has been possible in 
the past, and to obtain information 
about atmospheric densities and tem-
peratures above certain heights. The use 
of this information for various purposes, 
including the obvious military utility, 
would probably emerge from some later 
stage of development built around the 
knowledge gained by these initial ex-
perimental flights. 
Although one cannot at the moment 
really anticipate the contributions that 
might be made to scientific knowledge 
from satellites, it would seem probable 
that in the future, as in the past, 
considerations of security will be the 
dominant concern of nation-state offi-
cials. 1£ it is considered that security is 
endangered by the movement of space 
satellites above the state, and if the 
technological capability exists to do so, 
then such satellites will be destroyed, 
and this eventuality seems highly likely 
to come about by mutual tolerance even 
if a contiguous space for security is not 
established through international agree-
ment. 
The development just described with 
respect to security interests, which is 
closely analogous to the way in which 
the law of the sea has evolved, might 
also be expected to emerge with respect 
to other problems once the security 
interest is protected. Apart from the 
security aspect, the question is whether 
all the decision-makers of all the nation-
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states have sufficient interest in the 
various other purposes served by space 
travel-scientific inquiry, commercial, 
health, etc.-that a mutual tolerance in 
freedom of use will evolve. Since there 
would appear to be a strong common 
interest in promoting productive use of 
the outer spaces, the emergence of such 
mutual tolerance would seem highly 
probable. On the other hand, as with 
security, reasonable unilateral assertions 
of authority to protect the interests of 
particular states could be accommo-
dated within the structure of prescrip-
tion, assuring freedom of use for all. 
In sum, the probable developments 
with respect to outer spaces will include 
both the assertions of effective power 
from the land base that has charac-
terized territorial jurisdiction and some 
features of the common enjoyment and 
mutual toleration that have charac-
terized the customary international law 
of the sea. 
NOTES 
1. A. Ross, A Textbook of International Law, 1947, p. 137. 
2. Ibid., p. 138. 
----~----
